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Abstract 
Educational researchers have only recently and even then to a negligible extent begun to 
borrow analytical frameworks from cognitive psychology to address the systematic cognitive 
biases that pervade student learning. This review seeks to bridge the gap between educational 
research and cognitive psychology by analysing two mathematics education studies through 
the framework of dual-process theory of reasoning. The selected studies depict widespread 
cognitive biases, which dual-process theory can explain and potentially remedy. The first 
experimental study, which is borrowed from Dooren et al. (2003), reveals how the 
probabilistic reasoning of secondary school students (aged 15-18) is marked by inadequate 
responses that are the necessary result of intuitive Type 1 cognitive processes. The second 
experimental study taken from Lehman and Nisbett (1990) sheds light on the opposite 
channel of the relationship between reasoning and learning: the beneficial effect statistics 
education has on undergraduate students’ domain-general statistical reasoning. This far-
reaching observation is interpreted in terms of structural changes in students’ Type 1 and 
Type 2 cognitive processing. Given that research on cognitive science and mathematics 
education continues to be the result of separate scholarly communities, there remains a 
serious lack of empirical studies that apply frameworks from cognitive psychology to issues 
that are central to mathematics education. By interpreting the results of a dual-process 
analysis of two contrasting instances of mathematical learning, this review indicates and 
motivates promising future avenues for a more systematic collaboration between cognitive 
scientists and mathematics education researchers. This essay concludes by identifying the 
design-experimental methodology as a viable way through which dual-process theory could 
increase the effectiveness of classroom interventions. In turn, theory-driven classroom 
interventions may resolve some of the tensions between current dual-process theories.   
Keywords: cognitive processes, mathematics education, Type 1 and Type 2 processes, dual 
process theory, rational thinking errors 
 
Introduction 
Across the wide landscape of mathematics instruction, educators are perplexed and 
even disheartened by students who despite having the requisite disciplinary knowledge, 
repeatedly fail to apply formal reasoning. Instead of drawing on their formal knowledge base, 
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students often rely on intuitive problem-solving strategies, which lead to erroneous or 
formally inadequate responses. Given the immense extent to which intuitive problem-solving 
conflicts with effective learning and instruction, there is an increasing appreciation for the 
educational significance of remedying such systematic biases in learners’ reasoning (Attridge 
& Inglis, 2014; Babai, Shalev, & Stavy, 2015; Dooren, Bock, Depaepe, Janssens, & 
Verschaffel, 2003; Leron & Hazzan, 2006).  
To investigate the cognitive roots underlying this educational challenge, dual-process 
theorists attempt to explain how human reasoning is shaped by the interaction of two distinct 
types of cognitive processing (Stanovich, 2011). Whereas Type 1 processing is typically 
coined as heuristic or intuitive and is said to engender automatic first-impression cognitive 
processes, Type 2 processing is described as analytic requiring cognitive effort that loads 
heavily on a person's working memory. Given its limited scope, this review will focus on 
experimental evidence leaving the evaluation of significant theoretical (e.g., Dubinsky, 2002; 
Lieberman, 2009; Tzur & Simon, 2004) and neuropsychological (e.g., Goel, 2008; Tsuji & 
Watanabe, 2009) contributions to other reviewers.  
Since current empirical evidence of dual processes is primarily restricted to the field 
of cognitive psychology, dual-process theory severely lacks evidence of its applicability to 
educational problems (Gigerenzer, 2010; Keren & Schul, 2009). Through dual-process 
analyses of experimental data drawn from two complementary mathematics education 
studies, this review directly addresses this major shortcoming of dual-process theory 
motivating future investigation along this worthy avenue. The ultimate goal of this research 
initiative is to map pathways for integrating the currently separate projects conducted by 
dual-process theorists and mathematics education researchers (Dooren et al., 2003; 
Kryjevskaia, Stetzer, & Grosz, 2014; Leron & Hazzan, 2009).   
In the introductory part of this literature review, I will define the concepts that are 
integral to evaluating the symbiotic relationship between reasoning and mathematical 
learning. Key concepts that feature in this definitional section are Type 1 and Type 2 
cognitive processes, mathematical problem solving, and knowledge acquisition.  
The subsequent section introduces the main body of this review and serves three 
purposes: First, it provides a bird’s-eye view of dual-process theory. Second, it explains the 
disagreement between two influential mappings of cognitive architecture, namely the 
parallel-competitive and default-interventionist models. Third, it introduces a prominent 
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extension of dual-process theory, namely Stanovich’s tri-process model. The latter model will 
serve as the primary interpretative lens through which I will proceed to evaluate two 
empirical studies borrowed from the mathematics education literature.  
The third section will illuminate two particularly urgent areas of interaction between 
dual-process theory and mathematics education, namely their conflicting perspectives on 
erroneous problem solving and how the two types of cognitive processes relate to conceptual 
and procedural knowledge.  
In the final part of this review, I will proceed to interpreting two experimental studies 
of mathematical reasoning through an application of dual-process theory. In the first study, 
Dooren et al. (2003) present experimental evidence for how the so-called illusion of 
proportionality biases secondary school students' probabilistic reasoning. My corresponding 
dual-process analysis interprets students’ biased reasoning as an overreliance on Type 1 
cognitive processes. A second empirical case included in this review is the longitudinal study 
taken from Lehman and Nisbett (1990). The authors establish a connection between 
university students' improvements in domain-general statistical reasoning and the statistics 
education that those students received during their four years of undergraduate education. 
The evidence presented in Lehman and Nisbett is especially suitable for illuminating the 
opposite, equally pertinent, channel of the relationship between learners' reasoning and 
knowledge acquisition: the learning benefits that statistics knowledge may have for students' 
domain-general cognitive processing.                                                                                                                                   
1. Key Terminology 
1.1 Two Separable Types of Cognitive Processes  
Table T1, which considerably overlaps with “Table 1” in Evans and Stanovich (2013, 
p. 225) and “Table I.I” in Stanovich (2011, p. 18), juxtaposes the two types of cognitive 
processes in terms of their features, functional attributes, correlates, and their appearance in 
human life. I added four examples of how the two processing types may be used both within 
and outside the classroom to demonstrate their ubiquity. Finally, the evolutionary perspective 
of the two processing types, which is seen as a prominent contribution to dual-process theory, 
has also been included.   
Table T1.  Features, Correlates, and Attributes of the Two Cognitive Processing Types 
Type 1 processes (intuitive) Type 2 processes (analytic) 
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Defining features 
Autonomous processing Cognitive decoupling 
Independent of working memory Limited by working memory capacity 
Associated with the limbic system Associated with the prefrontal cortex 
Parallel operation possible  Only serial operation possible 
Weightier among novice learners Weightier among expert learners 
Functional attributes 
Fast Slow 
Autonomous Algorithmic 
Automatic Conscious 
Contextualised Abstract/decontextualised 
Implicit/tacit Explicit 
Intuitive Rational 
Reflexive Reflective 
Informal Formal 
Associative Rule-based 
Stimulus-bound Higher order 
Cognitively effortless Cognitively effortful 
Correlates 
Biased/modal responses Normative/formal responses 
Independent of cognitive ability Correlated with cognitive ability 
Examples of Use 
Recognising a friend’s face Memorising a new phone number 
Applying a familiar algorithm or rule Applying a new algorithm or rule 
Describing a graph Interpreting a graph 
Speaking in one’s mother tongue Speaking in a foreign language 
Alternative Terminology 
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System 1 System 2 
Heuristic processes Analytic processes 
Evolutionary Perspective 
Similar to animal cognition Distinctively human 
 
In light of the immense variety of labels associated with the two types of cognitive 
processes, I will pay special attention to justifying my choice of terminology. With the 
previously prevalent distinction between two types of cognitive systems (Stanovich, 1999) 
considered inadequate, there has been a recent trend to substitute “system 1/ system 2” 
(Kahneman, 2013) with Type 1 and Type 2 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). I 
accorded with this definitional trend recognising that the labels system 1 and system 2 may 
wrongly imply that each of a person's cognitive processes originate from a singular system 1 
or system 2. By using terms as restrictive as system 1 and system 2, one excludes the 
possibility of a given cognitive process resulting from multiple cognitive systems and neural 
underpinnings (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This restriction is especially problematic in the 
context of system 1 as Stanovich (2009) demonstrated in his analysis of the autonomous set 
of systems (TASS). Through using the labels Type 1 and Type 2 one can effectively 
distinguish between two types of cognitive processing without making a claim about the 
number of cognitive or neural systems underlying those types of processing. 
1.2 Problem-Solving in the Context of Mathematics  
When using the term mathematical problem solving, I refer to a “situation that 
proposes a mathematical question whose solution is not immediately accessible to the solver” 
(Callejo, 2009, p. 112). According to this definition, problem solving is tied to Type 2 rather 
than Type 1 processing. This has to do with the assumption that Type 1 processing generates 
responses that are automatic and immediate - the opposite of what is thought to constitute 
problem solving according to the above definition. 
1.3 Knowledge Acquisition in Terms of Mathematical Learning 
In this review, I will typically use the general term learning instead of narrower 
alternatives such as response acquisition, knowledge acquisition or knowledge construction 
(Mayer, 1992). As such, no claim is made about the relative merits or weaknesses of the 
competing attempts to conceptualise the way knowledge becomes manifest in a learner’s 
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mind. Given this paper's limited scope, I will primarily deal with the subset of literature that 
illuminates the connection between cognition and learning in the mathematical domain. 
Occasionally, I will present cases in which learning implications for other Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) domains are discussed. 
2. Convergence and Conflict between Current Dual-Process Theories 
2.1 A Bird's-Eye View of Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning 
Table T2 summarises the scientific synergy accomplished by experimental and 
neuropsychological approaches to dual-process theory. The depicted variety of scientific 
subfields for which separable types of cognitive processes were proposed gives weight to my 
hypothesis of the existence of qualitatively distinct types of cognitive processes.  
Table T2. Methodological Approaches to Dual-Process Theory 
 
Methodology Key Publications Key Findings 
Experimental Attridge & Inglis, 
2014; De Neys, 2006 
(a & b);   De Neys, 
W., Schaeken, W., & 
d'Ydewalle, 2005; 
Evans, 1996; Evans 
& Curtis-Holmes, 
2005; Evans et al., 
2010; Kahneman, 
2011; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2000; 
Roberts & Newton, 
2001;                      
Stanovich, 2011; 
Stevenson & Over, 
1995; Van Hoof et 
al., 2013 
 Administering a challenging 
task prior to a cognitive 
reflection test (CRT) makes it 
more likely that participants will 
inhibit Type 1 processing 
 Belief bias increases, while 
logical accuracy decreases under 
(a) time constraints and (b) 
working memory load 
(inhibiting Type 2 processes) 
 Conjunction fallacy more 
common among those who give 
quick responses (linked with 
default Type 1 processes) 
 People’s ability to engage the 
reflective mind determines 
whether Type 2 processes will 
override Type 1 processes 
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 Type 2 processing positively 
correlated with cognitive ability 
and formally correct responses 
Neuropsychological De Neys, Vartanian, 
& Goel, 2008; Goel, 
2008; Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 
2004); Lieberman, 
2007; Tsuji & 
Watanabe, 2009; 
 
 Belief-based responses were 
systematically linked with 
different brain areas compared 
to reason-based responses 
 When belief-based reasoning 
was inhibited, right prefrontal 
cortex areas were activated 
 Prefrontal and frontal cortical 
areas were activated when 
participants made monetary 
decisions on the basis of 
deferred rather than immediate 
reward 
 By contrast, when immediate 
reward was chosen, this was 
associated with the limbic 
system 
 Greater activity of prefrontal 
cortex and parietal lobes when 
deontological reasoning was 
overridden by consequentialist 
reasoning 
 Despite being aware of a 
conflict between their intuitive 
and normative reasoning, 
participants give intuitive 
responses on a decision-making 
task  
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2.2 Cognitive Architecture: Parallel-Competitive versus Default-Interventionist 
Structure 
Apart from knowing the distinctive roles and features of Type 1 and Type 2 
processing, an important project pursued by dual-process theorists is to map the ways in 
which these two types interact in a given brain. There are currently two major mappings 
suggested by dual-process researchers: the parallel-competitive and the default-
interventionist structure (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
The parallel-competitive model proposed by Sloman (1996) suggests that Type 1 and 
2 processing operate independently providing their individual solutions to problems. Despite 
the word competitive being part of its label, the parallel-competitive structure presupposes a 
cooperation between Type 1 and 2 processing, which is captured by the analogy of “two 
experts who are working cooperatively to compute sensible answers” (Sloman, 1996, p. 6). 
Thus, although Type 1 and 2 processing are assumed to proceed autonomously, an agent's 
eventual response may result from work performed by both types of processing (Leron & 
Hazzan, 2006). The simultaneous operation of Type 1 and Type 2 processing characteristic of 
the parallel-competitive model makes it especially challenging to pinpoint the type of 
processing that generated a response or solution in a given educational instance. 
By contrast, according to the default- interventionist model originally coined by Evans 
(2007) rapid and automatic Type 1 processing provides a default response to a given task or 
problem, while Type 2 processing has as a monitory function and may promote an alternative 
response if the default response generated by Type 1 processing is deemed inadequate. 
According to Evans (2007), this creates three possible processing outcomes: 
1. The default response R generated by Type 1 processing is chosen without the intervention 
of Type 2 processing, 
2. The default response R generated by Type 1 processing is chosen despite the intervention 
of Type 2 processing, 
3. The alternative response A is chosen after an intervention of Type 2 processing. 
In contrast to the parallel-competitive model, the default- interventionist structure 
allows one to pinpoint the processing type that determined a person's response in all three of 
the above cases. In the first outcome, the agent would lack awareness of the process that 
guided her response, which suggests that Type 1 processing was at work. In the second 
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outcome, the agent will remember both the intervention of Type 2 processing and her 
decision to favour a response, which wasn't consciously generated. In the third case, the agent 
will explain her response in terms of the intervention of Type 2 processing whose response 
was favoured by the agent. 
2.3 An Extension of Conventional Dual-Process Theory: Stanovich's Tri-Process Model  
As illustrated in Figure 1, Stanovich’s tri-process model of the mind (2009; 2011) consists of 
the autonomous mind (Type 1 processing), the algorithmic mind (Type 2 processing), and the 
reflective mind. The latter construct cannot be attributed to either of the two processing types.  
 
 
Figure 1. Stanovich’s Tri-Process Model of the Mind 
 
At the heart of Stanovich’s model is the concept of "cognitive decoupling" (2011, p. 
48), which describes a person's ability to simulate secondary representations that are 
abstractions of the person’s primary representations of the surrounding world. Cognitive 
decoupling enables hypothetical thinking and is indispensable for departing from the 
automatic Type 1 responses generated by the autonomous mind. For a person to perform 
cognitive decoupling, an intricate interplay between the algorithmic and reflective minds has 
to take place: First, the reflective mind signals the need to engage in cognitive simulation to 
the algorithmic mind, which may inhibit and override Type 1 processing. In turn, the 
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algorithmic mind is responsible for sustaining the effortful cognitive decoupling. Provided a 
successful decoupling operation, the agent will perform the Type 2 response generated by the 
algorithmic mind or the alternative response generated by the reflective mind. Figure 1’s 
bidirectional arrows connecting the autonomous, algorithmic, and reflective minds illustrate 
that the three minds can send as well as receive information. 
The reflective mind is argued to overlap with the category of Type 2 processing, 
while being functionally different from what is typically associated with Type 2 processing: 
whereas the algorithmic mind has been empirically linked to fluid intelligence and executive 
functioning (Stanovich, 2011; Tsuji & Watanabe, 2009), conventional dual-process theory 
failed to account for individual differences in critical thinking skills prior to Stanovich’s 
introduction of the reflective mind. According to Stanovich and West (1997), the reflective 
mind encompasses a person's rational thinking dispositions, which is a latent construct that 
they inferred from a total of 11 variables with notable examples such as participants' 
openness to ideas, their counterfactual thinking or their degree of dogmatism. Critical 
thinking skills or thinking dispositions were underscored to be both separable of cognitive 
ability and predicting considerable variation in participants' argument evaluation performance 
(Stanovich & West, 1997). 
One significant example of how the algorithmic mind can harm learning in the 
absence of reflective thought is one-sided thinking. One-sided thinking describes situations in 
which people fail to consider alternative approaches or information that might be crucial for 
revising the response generated by their Type 2 processing or algorithmic mind to reference 
Stanovich's terminology (2009). Thus, Stanovich promotes a concept of rationality that is 
more encompassing than the conventional account of Type 2 processing: people's thinking 
dispositions constitute a second integral component and driver of Type 2 processing in 
addition to cognitive ability. Stanovich depicts the mutual dependence between the 
algorithmic and reflective mind by visualising the algorithmic mind as the mechanical 
foundation of rationality, which is a necessary, but insufficient condition for rationality: 
rational thought and action remain contingent on the agent's thinking dispositions, which are 
intrinsic to her reflective mind (Stanovich, 2009). 
The substantial effect of thinking dispositions on task performance is supported by 
Toplak's and Stanovich's (2002) results from regression analyses of data on six problem-
solving and decision-making tasks: the two thinking dispositions variables predicted twice of 
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the unique variance (11.8%) of participants' task performance relative to the cognitive ability 
measure (5.2%). Meanwhile, the value of thinking dispositions as a variable of special 
interest to educational researchers hinges on learners' thinking dispositions being malleable, 
which is the case according to Baron's investigation (2005). 
3. Interaction between Dual-Process Theory and Mathematics Education 
Research 
Having outlined the cornerstones of recent advances in dual-process theory, I will turn 
to exposing notable areas of overlap and tension between views held by dual-process 
theorists and mathematics education researchers. As such, the present section will indicate 
avenues through which dual-process theory may productively inform mathematics education. 
3.1 Two Conflicting Perspectives on Erroneous Problem Solving 
According to the first perspective associated with mathematics teachers and education 
researchers, errors in students' problem solving are bugs that can be explained by one or a 
combination of the following learning circumstances: 
1. Students lack the requisite conceptual or procedural knowledge for formal reasoning and 
problem solving (Leron & Hazzan, 2009), 
2. Students lack the requisite cognitive ability for formal reasoning (Kryjevskaia et al., 2014). 
Whereas the first explanation allows for the possibility that students will eventually 
acquire the disciplinary knowledge that is necessary for formal reasoning, the second 
explanation entails that some students may be generally incapable of processing formal 
reasoning. A seminal example of the first explanation is the Van Hiele model of geometric 
thought (Crowley, 1987), which comprises five hierarchical levels of understanding. This 
model implies that through progressing to more advanced levels of geometric understanding, 
learners' initially superficial and informal reasoning will tend to become more formal.  
For example, a novice to geometry tends to describe geometric shapes such as 
triangles or rectangles in terms of their overall shape rather than their formal characteristics 
like the number of sides or angles. At the basic levels of geometric understanding described 
by Van Hiele's visualisation or analysis level (Crowley, 1987), learners are yet unable to 
apply formal reasoning. Once learners achieve more sophisticated levels of understanding 
such as deduction or rigour, learners are expected to consistently apply formal rather than 
intuitive reasoning. Assuming that students possess both the disciplinary knowledge and the 
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requisite cognitive hardware, which are collectively considered sufficient conditions for 
formal reasoning, this perspective cannot account for students' inconsistent use of formal 
reasoning. 
Dual-process theory, which is largely ignored by mathematics educators and 
education researchers (Kryjevskaia et al., 2014), meaningfully fills the above explanatory 
gap. This account suggests that in addition to the two learning circumstances already 
discussed in this section, two additional conditions need to be fulfilled for formal reasoning 
to manifest in students' problem solving (Stanovich, 2011): 
1. Students need to consciously engage the specific Type 2 processes that allow them to 
process their acquired formal understanding, 
2. The activated Type 2 processes need to override students' default Type 1 processes, which 
offer an informal, often intuitively appealing, approach to problem solving. 
The human tendency to act as a “cognitive miser” (Stanovich, 2011, p. 21) exerting as 
little cognitive effort as possible explains instances in which learners engage in cognitively 
effortful Type 2 processing in an insufficient manner or avoid it altogether. Crucially, a richer 
domain-specific understanding can only attenuate this educationally troubling tendency to 
miserly processing, which persists even among expert learners. Under both of the above 
scenarios, the lack of cognitive effort often means that students default to responses that can 
be traced back to automatic Type 1 processes. Given that both educator and student can only 
observe the erroneous problem solving that results from miserly Type 1 processing, students' 
disciplinary knowledge and ability to formal reasoning may remain hidden and therefore 
unknown. This phenomenon constitutes the unfortunate source of the first perspective, which 
is solely based on students’ responses and thus neglects the cognitive processes that underlie 
those responses.   
3.2. Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge in Relation to the Two Processing Types  
The mathematics educational distinction between conceptual and procedural 
knowledge exhibits a striking and potentially informative overlap with this paper's distinction 
between Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. Conceptual knowledge is described as a 
“connected web of knowledge, a network in which the linking relationships are as prominent 
as the discrete pieces of information” (Hiebert, 1986, pp. 3-4). Such knowledge is 
independent of specific problem types and can be retrieved and known outside a particular 
learning context. By contrast, procedural knowledge or skill refers to “knowledge of 
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procedures, including action sequences and algorithms used in problem solving” (Star & 
Stylianides, 2013, p. 6) and usually can only be retrieved by the learner when solving the 
specific set of problems for which this knowledge was acquired. The relationship between 
conceptual and procedural is suggested to be reciprocal and iterative (Rittle-Johnson & 
Alibali, 1999): It is reciprocal in the sense that gains in one type of knowledge usually 
engender gains in the other knowledge type. The relationship is iterative as the two types of 
knowledge are said to develop in a tandem. Strikingly, my dual-process analysis of the 
empirical case presented in Section 4.2 proposes an analogous reciprocal relationship 
between the two cognitive processing types: through learning to sustain the Type 2 cognitive 
processes that are necessary for processing formal statistical reasoning, the quality of 
students’ default Type 1 responses (see Figure 1) is suggested to improve over the course of 
their undergraduate education. When students had little or no statistics training, effortful 
Type 2 processes were necessary for processing the algorithm that would lead to the correct 
solution. If, at that time, students only relied on their Type 1 processing they would be most 
likely unable to arrive at the correct solution. After receiving prolonged statistical training, 
which formed a compulsory part of students’ undergraduate education, the same students 
may have been able to process the formally correct algorithm through the use of automatic 
and effortless Type 1 processing. 
One crucial implication of the above example is that the acquisition of statistics 
knowledge may change the very content of students’ cognitive processing. Substantial 
changes in students’ domain-specific understanding are likely to trigger structural changes in 
students’ cognition. The fundamental nature of these cognitive changes suggests that the 
operation of the two types of cognitive processing will change in a way that leads to new 
problem-solving responses.  It seems impossible and skewed to inextricably tie procedural 
and conceptual knowledge to a single type of cognitive processing. Instead, the use of both 
procedural and conceptual knowledge seems to require different types of processing 
depending on students’ level of domain-specific understanding. This important, but complex 
relationship between knowledge and processing types illustrates the need for a closer 
investigation of learning progressions through collaboration between cognitive scientists and 
mathematics education researchers. Through this scientific synergy one may tap into the 
cognitive mechanisms that can explain and predict learners' gains in procedural and 
conceptual knowledge in mathematical domains other than statistics. Such insights would 
increase the effectiveness of classroom interventions that are designed to facilitate students' 
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acquisition of these two types of knowledge. There seem to be, at least, two conditions that 
such a research project will need to fulfil: 
1. It needs to rely on repeated continuous rather than categorical measures of participants' 
growth in conceptual and procedural knowledge (Rittle-Johnson & Alibali, 1999), 
2. It needs to account for any qualitative changes in participants' cognitive processing, which 
are expected to manifest as participants progress in their learning. These changes may be 
measured through administering a standard or modified version of the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).  
The above examples are only a small subset of significant areas of overlap between 
dual-process theory and mathematics education research. To gain greater understanding of 
these areas of overlap as well as their educational implications, researchers in the two fields 
need to pursue collaborative rather than independent projects. This collaboration may 
culminate in the rise of journals, conferences, and research centres that span the two fields. 
Finally, there is an urgent need for researchers who combine expertise in dual-process theory 
and mathematics education.  
4. Dual-Process Analyses of Mathematical Reasoning 
Table T3 sketches only a few examples of previous dual-process analyses of mathematical 
reasoning, which served as a springboard for this section’s two empirical studies. The 
depicted diversity of mathematical domains for which dual-process theory was suggested to 
be a meaningful analytical framework strengthens my hypothesis of its applicability to issues 
pertaining to mathematics education. 
Table T3. Thumbnail Summary of Existing Applications of Dual-Process Theory to 
Mathematics Education 
Publications Mathematical Area Observed Cognitive 
Bias 
Obersteiner et al., 2013 Number Theory Natural Number Bias 
(NNB) 
Clement et al., 1981;         
Leron & Hazzan, 2006 
Algebra  Word order 
matching 
 Static comparison 
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Babai et al., 2015;              
Stavy & Tirosh, 1996 
 
Geometry Larger shape area is 
associated with a larger 
perimeter 
Dooren et al., 2003;         
Leron & Hazzan, 2009; 
Kahneman, 2013 
Probability and statistics  Proportional/linear 
reasoning 
 Base rate 
neglect/fallacy 
 Conjunction fallacy 
 
 
4.1 Empirical Study I: The Illusion of Proportionality in Probabilistic Reasoning 
4.1.1 Study Background and Reasons for Inclusion 
The experimental study in Dooren et al. (2003) has been selected from a sparse body 
of mathematics education studies that tap into the cognitive roots of students’ fallacious 
reasoning. The study provides evidence that participants solve probabilistic tasks by routinely 
applying a proportional reasoning strategy: participants' approach to problem solving aligns 
with the proportions outlined in the task instructions. Since this proportional strategy 
instantly becomes participants' default problem-solving strategy, this implies that Type 1 
cognitive processes prevailed whenever participants applied the proportional strategy. The 
experiment's underlying connection between observed patterns in participants' problem 
solving and the cognitive architecture inherent to dual-process theory justifies its appearance 
in this review. Another reason is that probability theory is widely regarded as a domain of 
mathematics for which there is conclusive empirical evidence on the misleading nature of 
people's intuitions and preconceptions (e.g., Dooren et al., 2003; Kahneman, 2013), which I 
will link with the predominant role that Type 1 processes play in participants’ cognitive 
processing. Meanwhile, the illusion of proportionality is a notable example of fallacious 
reasoning in the study of both probability and geometry (Dooren et al., 2003). Another 
striking feature of this study is that students' proportional reasoning led to varying test 
outcomes across distinct types of test questions. Whereas being guided by a proportional 
strategy would typically lead to finding the correct solution in the case of a qualitative item, 
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this strategy was the prime reason for mistakes on quantitative questions (Dooren et al., 
2003).  
An educationally troubling observation is that participants' proportional reasoning 
was the direct result of the prior mathematics education they received at school. Since their 
mathematics instruction emphasised and valued proportional reasoning, students began to 
routinely rely on this type of reasoning without exerting cognitive effort to assess whether it 
is most or even minimally applicable in a specific learning circumstance. The following dual-
process analysis will reveal how prior knowledge of proportionality may entice learners to 
employ Type 1 instead of Type 2 processing. The experimental data that the following 
analysis relies on is taken from Dooren et al. (2003). 
4.1.2 Dual-Process Analysis 
In case of the qualitative test items, which received 88.9% correct answers, my theory 
proposes that participants' Type 1 processing enabled students to arrive at the correct 
solution. There are, at least, two reasons for supposing that participants were employing Type 
1 rather than Type 2 processing in those instances: 
Firstly, as emphasised by Dooren et al. (2003), the concept of proportionality is a 
centrepiece of participants' mathematics education prior to the experiment. Analogous to the 
driving case presented in Leron and Hazzan (2006), the use of proportional reasoning 
probably constituted a cognitively effortful Type 2 process before students began to 
extensively practise this approach in the classroom. Through repeated application and due to 
the intuitiveness of proportional reasoning (Dooren et al., 2003), its application became a 
default Type 1 process to students. 
Secondly, by knowing that the experimental participants employed proportional 
thinking when solving the quantitative test problems, there is little reason to suppose that 
their cognitive processing changed within a single experiment: both the quantitative and 
qualitative test items were testing a single type of probabilistic reasoning. 
The same proportional reasoning strategy that led to 88.9% correct answers on 
qualitative problems, misguided participants on quantitative problems with the latter 
receiving only 22.4% correct answers. What is revealing is that most participants perceived 
the incorrect application of linear thinking as self-evident. For instance, a 12th grader named 
Anneken remarked: “In the second case, you get double as much occasions to obtain double 
as much fives. Therefore, logically speaking, the statement should be correct” (p.131). 
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Similarly, a 10th grader called Karen explained his fallacious reasoning in the following 
manner: “The occasions are halved, but also the goals. It is still directly proportional” (p. 
129). Crucially, the varying test and learning outcomes triggered by the participants' use of 
Type 1 processing across qualitative and quantitative test items, is in line with dual-process 
theory. There is nothing about Type 1 processes that guarantees them to lead to correct 
problem solving for a specific category of mathematical problems. Thus, it would be 
erroneous to infer from the above experiment that Type 1 processing generally yields correct 
answers on qualitative test items. Similarly, there is no ground for establishing that Type 1 
processing always or even typically misguides students in the case of quantitative problems.  
Rather, Type 1 processing’s learning implications depend on the quality of those 
cognitive processes in a given learner. The results of the probabilistic experiment imply that 
most of the participants' Type 1 processing is at a level that allows correct problem-solving 
on the experiment's qualitative items, but rules out correct problem-solving on the 
experiment's quantitative items. In illustration, it is worth consulting a specific set of test 
items. For that purpose, I will consult experimental variable p, which exhibits the most 
drastic variation of correct answers between qualitative and quantitative items among all the 
study's variables. Whereas the qualitative items received, on average, 95.6% correct answers, 
only an average of 16% of participants gave the correct answer on the quantitative item. 
The qualitative test item on variable p: 
“I roll a fair die several times. The chance to have at least once an even number if I can roll 
two times is 
(a) larger than, 
(b) smaller than or, 
(c) equal to 
the chance to have at least once a six if I can roll two times” (p. 131).   
The corresponding quantitative item: 
“I roll a fair die several times. The chance to have at least once an even number if I can roll 
three times is three times as large as the chance to have at least once a five if I can roll three 
times. 
(a) This is true, 
(b) This is not true” (p. 131). 
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By consulting participants' written explanations, Dooren et al. were able to verify 
whether students' problem solving was characterised by proportional thinking. From that 
data, Dooren et al. inferred that 95.6% of 10th graders and 86.9% of 12th graders applied 
proportional thinking when giving an incorrect answer on the above quantitative item. An 
explanation offered by Mathilde who is one of the 10th graders participating in the experiment 
will illustrate how using proportionality as a default strategy can lead to a mistake: 
“The odd numbers on a die are 1,3,5 = 3/6 
The chance to get one of the three numbers is three times as large as the chance to get 
a five = 1/6 (p. 131)”. 
Strikingly, although Mathilde was able to correctly determine the probability of 
getting an odd number on a single try, she ignored an essential piece of information 
mentioned in the instruction: the die is rolled three times rather than once. Dooren et al. 
promote this type of error being the result of pupils' linear thinking producing an automatic 
mental response. Thus, the immediate availability of this response predetermined pupils' 
problem solving. Crucially, the way Dooren et al. interpret participants' behaviour 
extensively overlaps with the definition of Type 1 processing featured at an earlier stage of 
this review. Supporting our hypothesis that Type 1 processes informed participants’ 
reasoning is that Mathilde's act of calculating the probability of a simplified event is 
compatible with what Kahneman (2013) denotes as substitution.  
Being presented with a cognitively challenging probabilistic problem, people tend to 
subconsciously substitute a difficult problem with an easier heuristic one. Thus, Mathilde 
gives a correct answer to a wrong problem, which was set up by her Type 1 processing. 
Through the creation of an easy-to-solve problem with an immediately accessible solution, 
Mathilde managed to maintain cognitive ease (Kahneman, 2013): a situation perceived as 
familiar and comfortable without the need for effortful engagement of Type 2 processing. 
Mathilde's erroneous problem solving is argued to be common among novices who tend to 
focus on surface-level features of a task (Berliner & Calfee, 1996). By contrast, more 
experienced learners tend to integrate task elements into abstract schemas that are elusive to 
novices (Berliner & Calfee, 1996). 
It is timely to recall the disagreement among dual-process theorists whether a person's 
cognitive architecture is best described by a parallel-competitive (Sloman, 1996) or a default-
interventionist model (Evans, 2007). Verifying the applicability of the parallel-competitive 
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model, the written explanations collected from the 10th and 12th graders participating in 
Dooren's experiment (2003) show no indication for a conflict or a parallel interplay between 
distinct types of processing. Rather, pupils seem to be guided by a default response that was 
unconsciously generated in their minds (Dooren et al., 2003). Instead of reflecting on the 
validity and suitability of the automatic Type 1 responses generated by the autonomous mind 
(see Figure 1), an overwhelming majority of pupils routinely implemented the default 
responses when answering the quantitative test items. There is no sign that participants 
engage their algorithmic or reflective minds whose combined operation is necessary for 
generating alternative responses. The only compatible among the three possible processing 
outcomes proposed by Evans (2007) is the case in which Type 1 processing generates a 
response without any intervention by Type 2 processing. This interpretation gives weight to 
the default-interventionist model of cognitive architecture. 
4.2 Empirical Study II: The Cognitive Effects of Undergraduate Education on 
Statistical Reasoning 
4.2.1 Study Background and Reasons for Inclusion 
Complementing Study I from the previous section, Study II (Lehman and Nisbett, 
1990) has been drawn from the miniscule cognitive science literature that analyses 
longitudinal changes in students’ statistical reasoning. The data found in Lehman and Nisbett 
(1990) provide an empirical foundation for illuminating the reverse channel of the 
relationship between reasoning and learning performance: the effect of knowledge 
acquisition on learners' use of Type 1 and Type 2 processing and its effectiveness. There are 
several pertinent reasons for including this specific study: First, the study's results suggest a 
particularly significant improvement in students' statistical-methodological reasoning, which 
is of central concern to both dual-process theorists and mathematics education researchers. 
Second, participants' statistical-methodological reasoning was measured both in a domain-
specific and domain-general setup: the study's participants completed a test that combined 
scientific and everyday-life problems. This variety of mathematical problems intentionally 
designed by Lehman and Nisbett indicates that the observed changes in students' reasoning 
hold for domains that can be regarded as mutually independent. For that reason, I find this 
study's results more credible than alternative ones, which verify changes in people's 
reasoning in a single or otherwise more narrow context (e.g., Lem, 2015; Morsanyi, 
Busdraghi, & Primi, 2014).  
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An additional strength of this study is its sample data, which features a total of 121 
students across a wide range of subjects including the natural sciences, humanities, social 
sciences, and psychology. The richness of the sample makes it possible to verify the presence 
of heterogeneous treatment effects. In other words, it is possible to compare changes in 
statistical reasoning not only within individuals, but also between students with varying 
degrees of statistics training. The experimental data that the following analysis relies on is 
taken from Lehman and Nisbett (1990). 
4.2.2 Dual-Process Analysis 
My conjecture is that there are two possible explanations for the substantial 
improvement in statistical reasoning that experimental participants achieved throughout their 
undergraduate studies: First, after having received statistics training in the course of their 
undergraduate education, the now final (fourth) year students were more likely to approach 
statistical problems through the use of Type 2 processing. Thus, compared to when the same 
students were in their very first semester, their reasoning was more likely to be dominated by 
Type 2 processes. In other words, as a consequence of their statistics training, students were 
increasingly able to critically reflect on the default responses generated by Type 1 processing 
with Type 2 processing interfering when necessary (Stanovich & West, 1997). 
A second explanation is that through their statistical training students’ Type 1 
processing improved in a way that would be compatible with the observed improvements in 
statistical reasoning (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990). What previously would require effortful 
Type 2 processes was now performed by means of the immediate responses generated by 
automatic Type 1 processes. Thus, even without interventions of Type 2 processing, students' 
refined Type 1 processing may explain the highlighted improvements in statistical reasoning. 
Meanwhile, these two dual-process explanations are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Through repeated practice learners’ performance is said to become more automatic, whereby 
an increasing number of previously controlled cognitive processes becomes available for 
abstract processing (Gagné, 1985). Gagné maintains that this process of unitisation is marked 
by people's reorganisation of knowledge: the skills that are necessary to complete a given 
task or problem are organised into larger and more efficient units enabling more effective 
problem solving. Extrapolating from Gagné's theory of unitisation, one may argue that the 
students with enhanced statistical reasoning featuring in the sample collected by Lehman and 
Nisbett, were more likely to exhibit two cognitive trends:  
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1. Following their statistical training, students’ Type 1 processing became more efficient 
compared to their Type 1 processing prior to taking statistics courses and thus engendered the 
observed improvements in reasoning, 
2. Having already practiced with numerous statistical problems, the statistical reasoning test 
administered by Lehman and Nisbett created less cognitive strain among students compared 
to when the students were new to statistical problems (Kahneman, 2013). As a consequence 
of the reduced cognitive strain, students were more likely to employ abstract Type 2 
processing, which may explain their improved test performance. 
In order to further evaluate the relationship between knowledge acquisition and 
reasoning one should consider the significant correlations between the number of statistics 
courses taken by students and the associated improvement in their "statistical-methodological 
reasoning" (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990, p. 957). Such a correlation was observed across three 
out of the four subject areas: psychology, social sciences, and natural sciences with the 
respective correlation coefficients amounting to .23, .23, and .28. Due to the small number of 
statistics courses taken by humanities students, Lehman and Nisbett regarded the sample of 
humanities students as insufficient for calculating a correlation. The observed correlation 
coefficients give weight to the general hypothesis that, by working on statistics courses, 
students not only acquire statistical knowledge, but also enhance their overall statistical 
reasoning. An even more notable observation is that students' improvements in reasoning are 
contingent on the number of courses they have taken throughout their studies. The latter 
relationship can be explained by expanding on the two dual-process explanations that I 
elucidated earlier in this section. 
The first explanation, which centres on the increased role of Type 2 processing, 
entails that students who took a relatively large number of statistics courses were more likely 
to employ strenuous Type 2 processing compared to students who received relatively little 
statistical training. Thus, the former group’s problem solving was more immune to 
misleading Type 1 processing compared to the latter group. In terms of the three possible 
outcomes originating from Evans' default-interventionist model (2007), the former group was 
more likely than the latter to achieve either the second outcome - the default response R 
generated by Type 1 processing is chosen despite the intervention of Type 2 processing - or 
the third outcome - the alternative response A is chosen after an intervention of Type 2 
processing (Evans, 2007). Thus, the students with extensive statistical training benefited from 
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Type 2 processing as an analytical monitor of their Type 1 processing, whereby they 
managed to deviate from an erroneous default response R. 
The second explanation of students’ refined statistical reasoning, which proposes a 
more efficient working of Type 1 processing, implies that the more statistical instruction 
students receive, the more adept their Type 1 processing becomes at solving any type of 
statistical problems or tasks. Different from Evans' model (2007), which includes only one 
possible response R generated by Type 1 processing, this interpretation allows for multiple 
responses being generated by Type 1 processes accounting for changes in learners’ 
knowledge base. Accordingly, it may be that a participant’s original Type 1 response R, 
which determined her problem-solving during the experiment's first reasoning test (Lehman 
& Nisbett, 1990) is qualitatively different from the Type 1 response R' appearing in the same 
participant's mind during the experiment's second reasoning test during her fourth year of 
undergraduate studies. Whereas response R may have elicited a fallacious solution, response 
R' may have helped the student to arrive at a correct solution. 
A highlight of the experimental analysis carried out by Lehman and Nisbett is that 
they were able to test both domain-specific and domain-general reasoning ability. Given that 
domain-general reasoning is an especially pressing concern among educators and educational 
researchers, tapping into a potential cause of this type of reasoning is an educationally 
paramount project (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2012; Niaz, 1994). By choosing this form of research 
design, Lehman and Nisbett accounted for the possibility that the observed changes in 
domain-specific reasoning may result from students’ refined statistical knowledge base rather 
than fundamental changes in their cognitive processing. Given that participants’ statistical 
reasoning improved on both domain-specific and domain-general test items, it seems that as a 
result of their statistics education students began to employ more refined statistical reasoning 
even when dealing with novel and unrelated problems that weren't covered in their statistics 
classes. What exactly justifies this argumentative leap?  
To assert the validity of this argument it is worth looking at an exemplary every-day 
life problem, which forms part of the statistical reasoning test featuring in Lehman and 
Nisbett. Participants were asked to explain why rookies of the year in major-league baseball 
tend not to do as well in their second league year. The experimenters did not mention 
regression to the mean, which is a statistical principle that facilitates correct problem solving 
on this test item. In order to solve this problem, participants had to apply the statistical 
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principle they learned in class. Since it is exceedingly unlikely that students learned about 
regression to the mean by the means of this particular baseball example, the participants’ 
improved test performance indicates that their understanding of regression of the mean 
transformed the way their cognitive processing would operate when presented with such a or 
a similar statistical problem. Thus, one would expect the students to successfully identify 
regression to the mean problems taken from other randomly selected domains with which 
students had no prior learning experience. 
One important question that remained untouched by Lehman and Nisbett is how 
temporary or permanent the observed improvements in students’ reasoning are. As suggested 
by the theoretical and empirical evidence on Type 1 processing evaluated in this review, 
Type 1 processes are not fixed algorithms, but evolve in response to individual learning 
progressions (Lehrer & Schauble, 2012). In light of this malleability associated with Type 1 
processing an important educational and theoretical consideration is whether and how 
changes in cognitive processing that are favourable to people's learning, as for instance the 
statistical reasoning improvements documented by Lehman and Nisbett, can be sustained 
over time. Hence, when designing an experimental study similar to the one found in Lehman 
and Nisbett, it appears advantageous to verify participants’ cognitive processing at a third 
time point at which participants have already completed their statistics education. 
Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research 
Researchers of mathematics education are increasingly aware of dual-process theory 
as a valuable analytical framework for evaluating and improving students’ mathematical 
reasoning. While the application of dual-process theory to the study of mathematics 
education is only at its advent, this research avenue begins to gain ground with increasing 
speed and impact (see Kryjevskaia et al., 2014; Lem, 2015; Morsanyi et al., 2014). 
In this review, I have synthesised recent conceptual trends in dual-process theory of 
reasoning and subsequently introduced two experimental studies of mathematical learning 
that merit an application of dual-process theory. My dual-process analyses indicate the 
immense extent to which the effectiveness of mathematics education depends on learners’ 
use of Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. Thus, this paper has made a case for bridging 
the two largely separate bodies of literature on dual processing and mathematics education. 
Such scientific synergy promises to benefit the two scientific communities and in turn to 
empower mathematics educators and students. 
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On the one hand, dual-process theorists could markedly refine their accounts by 
testing the exact interplay between Type 1 and 2 processing across different areas of 
mathematics education. This form of theory testing promises to advance dual-process theory 
in two significant regards: testing the accuracy of the parallel-competitive and default-
interventionist cognitive mappings (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) and examining the validity of 
Stanovich’s tri-process model, which proposes a complex interaction between the algorithmic 
and the reflective minds. 
On the other hand, dual-process theory offers educational researchers a valuable 
interpretative lens through which they can tap into and effectively remedy cases in which 
students are misled by either type of cognitive processing or their combined failure. One 
promising way to nurture a collaboration between dual-process theorists and mathematics 
education researchers is to analyse the varying roles Type 1 and 2 processing play across 
different time points of a mathematical learning unit both within the same and across distinct 
learners. A potential methodological direction for accomplishing a fruitful collaboration 
between cognitive psychology and mathematics education research is to conduct longitudinal 
design-experiments across distinct classroom settings. This methodology combines the 
practical purpose of improving instruction and the theoretical purpose of refining dual-
process theory. 
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